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UNI TED S TA TES V. A R VIZ U:

INVESTIGATORY STOPS AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Arvizu,' the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit investigatory stops as long as the facts and
circumstances lead to a reasonable suspicion that the driver is engaged in
criminal activity. This Note 2 argues that the decision in United States v.
Arvizu is correct in spite of counterarguments that the decision encourages
racial profiling and permits an officer to stop a vehicle for any reason.
First, the prior investigatory stop cases of United States v. Sokolow,3 United
States v. Cortez,4 and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,5 which hold that an
officer may make an investigatory stop if the totality of the circumstances
leads to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, support the
Arvizu decision. Second, examining the facts and circumstances of each
case is the best method of determining whether the investigatory stop is
constitutional. Third, the reasonable suspicion analysis should view the
facts and circumstances from the perspective of law enforcement because of
their experience and familiarity with criminal behavior and their knowledge
of common practices in illegal drug and alien smuggling. Finally, the
suggested effects of racial profiling and an officer's ability to stop a vehicle
for any reason will not occur because the analysis requires specific,
articulable facts.

1 534 U.S. 266 (2002).

This Note discusses reasonable suspicion in the context of individuals who have not
violated any law. For a discussion of reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative
detentions after a traffic stop, see James A. Brown, Miles of Asphalt and the Evolving Rule
2

of Law: Are We There Yet?, 71 J. KAN. B.A. 21, 24-28 (2002). Also, this Note was

submitted for publication in December 2002 and does not reflect any recent updates.
3 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
4 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
5 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. FROM PROBABLE CAUSE TO REASONABLE SUSPICION
The Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals "against
unreasonable searches and seizures,' 6 applies to investigatory stops where
the individual has not violated any law.7 Generally, the Fourth Amendment
requires individual suspicion and probable cause to conduct a search. 8
However, in certain circumstances, individual suspicion and probable cause
are replaced with reasonable suspicion due to the necessity for "swift action
9
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat."
In Terry v. Ohio, an officer observed two men standing on a street
comer. 10 Over a period of approximately ten minutes, the officer observed
the men walk down the street, peer into a store window, and return to the
street comer almost twelve times between the two of them." A third man
next appeared, briefly spoke to the two men, and walked away.' 2 The two
men then walked back to the store window where they met the third man
again.' 3 Believing that the men were casing the store for a robbery, the
officer approached the men and asked for their names.14 When the men
responded inaudibly, the officer grabbed one of the men and patted him
5
down, discovering a gun.'
The Supreme Court held that the officer did not need probable cause to
search for weapons because the governmental interest in detecting and

6

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Id.

7 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981).
8 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Terry has generated much commentary since its

decision in 1968. For recent articles discussing the case, see Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in
Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 491 (1999); Earl C.
Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk's
Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 891 (1998); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A
PracticallyPerfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 911 (1998).
10

Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.

id.at6.
12 id.
13 id.

'5

I4 at 6-7.
ld.
Id. at 7.
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preventing crime efficiently and effectively outweighed the brief intrusion
on the individual's rights.' 6 Instead, the officer must rely on specific,
objective facts and any inferences from those facts that "reasonably warrant
that intrusion."'" This objective test inquires whether "the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
'8
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate."'
An officer must not rely on hunches,' 9 but only "specific reasonable
inferences ... in light of his experience."'
B. ROVING BORDER PATROLS AND THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Smugglers of illegal aliens and drugs use Arizona as a route from
Mexico. 20 In 2001, federal law enforcement officials seized almost 219,000
kilograms of marijuana and about 3345 kilograms of cocaine in Arizona.2'
Additionally, in the first six months of 2000, federal law enforcement
officers apprehended almost 177,000 illegal aliens trying to cross the
Arizona-Mexico border.22
The cost of detaining smugglers and illegal aliens is enormous.2 3 In
1999, Arizona spent $41,217,601 detaining illegal aliens for over 900,000
days of incarceration in state and local prisons.24 Furthermore, illegal
smuggling caused over thirteen accidents in 1999 due to overcrowded
vehicles.25 One Arizona hospital estimated that its expense for treatment of
illegal aliens is over $100,000.26
Checkpoints near the United States-Mexico border attempt to combat
the illegal alien and drug smuggling problems, 27 but smugglers use scarcely
16

Id. at 22, 24-27 (employing balancing test of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.

523, 534-37 (1967)).
'7 Id. at 21.
d8at 21-22.
d.
'9 Id

at 27.

20 Drug Enforcement Agency, Arizona State Factsheet on Drugs and Drug Abuse, at
http://usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/arizonaap.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002); Federation for
American Immigration Reform, Arizona: Illegal Aliens, at http://fairus.org/html/042azill.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002) [hereinafter FAIR].
21 Drug Enforcement Agency, Arizona State Factsheet on Drugs and Drug Abuse, at
http://usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/arizonaap.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
22 Glynn Custred, The American Spectator (Oct. 2000), at http://www.vdare.com/misc/
custred alien crossings.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
23 FAIR, supra note 20.
24 Id. (reporting statistics from fiscal year 1999).
25

Id.

26

Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of border checkpoints in United States

27
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populated back roads to avoid the checkpoints. 28 As a result, the United
States Border Patrol conducts roving patrols along these back roads 29using
investigatory stops to catch smugglers trying to avoid the checkpoints.
The Supreme Court first discussed "Terry stops" 30 in the context of

roving border patrols in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.31 There, an
officer patrolling the United States-Mexico border stopped a vehicle and
questioned the occupants about their citizenship solely because the
occupants looked Mexican.3 2 The officer learned that all three occupants
were illegally in the country and arrested them.33
34
The Court held that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
Ethnicity alone was not enough to create a reasonable belief that the
individuals were illegal aliens because many United States citizens,
especially in California, "appear" Mexican. 35 However, race may be a
factor for an immigration investigatory stop because the probability that a
Mexican is an alien is high enough to make it relevant. 36 Regardless, an
officer must have "specific articulable facts, together with rational
37
inferences from those facts ... that the vehicles contain [illegal] aliens."

The Court then articulated certain factors that may be used in
examining reasonable suspicion. 38 First, the characteristics of the area may
be relevant, including "its proximity to the border, the usual patterns of
39
traffic on the particular road, and previous experience with alien traffic."
Second, "information about recent illegal border crossings in the area" may
be relevant. 40 Third, "[t]he driver's behavior may be relevant, [such] as
erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade officers. 4 1 Fourth, the type of
vehicle may be considered in a reasonable suspicion analysis. 42 Fifth, "[t]he
v. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
28 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 269.
29 id.
30 A "Terry stop" is an investigatory stop that involves briefly detaining and questioning
an individual who has not violated the law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1484 (7th ed. 1999);
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3'422 U.S. 873 (1975).
32

Jd. at 875.

33id.
34 Id.

at 886-87.

35 id.
36

Id. at 887.

31Id.at 884.
38

Id. at 884.

39 Id.
41

41 Id.
42

at 884-85.

Id. at 885.
id.
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vehicle may appear to be heavily loaded, it may have an extraordinary3
number of passengers, or the officers may observe persons trying to hide'A
Finally, the ethnicity of the individual can be considered, assuming a
trained officer is able to determine ethnicity based on haircut or dress, but it
cannot be the sole factor." Although these factors may be relevant, the
outcome of any given case depends on the totality of the circumstances.4 5
United States v. Cortez formally adopted the totality of the
circumstances test for a reasonable suspicion analysis. 46 This test contains
two elements.47 First, the assessment must examine all the circumstances of
the case, including "objective observations, information from police reports
...and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds
of lawbreakers. 4 8 Based upon this information, officers draw on their
experience and training in law enforcement to make inferences.4 9 Second,
all facts and inferences must amount to50 a reasonable suspicion that the
individual is engaged in criminal activity.
After Cortez, many appellate courts developed a restrictive list of
permissible factors in an attempt to refine the totality of the circumstances
test, 5' but the Supreme Court rejected these attempts. 52 According to the
Court, not only is the notion of reasonable suspicion not easily "reduced to
a neat set of legal rules," 53 but also refining the analysis "creates
unnecessary difficulty in dealing with54one of the relatively simple concepts
embodied in the Fourth Amendment."
43

Id.

44 Id. The Ninth Circuit recently held that race is not a relevant factor any longer in
a

reasonable suspicion analysis due to the dramatically changing demographics in the United
States. The Court noted that minorities (Hispanic, African Americans, Asians and Native
Americans) comprise almost fifty percent of the population of California. The Court also
noted that California, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Jersey each have a
Hispanic population greater than one million. "Accordingly, Hispanic appearance is of little
or no use in determining which particular individuals among the vast Hispanic populace
should be stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal aliens." United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 889 (2000)
(citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)).
45 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 at n.10 (1975).
46 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981).
41 Id.at 418.
48 Id.
9 Id. (likening officers' ability to make . "common-sense conclusions about human
behavior" to jurors' ability).
50 Id.

51 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987).
52

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989).

53 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
14 Sokolow,

490 U.S. at 7-8.
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C. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A REASONABLE SUSPICION
ANALYSIS
In Ornelas v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that appellate
courts must review reasonable suspicion cases de novo, while giving due
weight to the factual inferences of the trial judge and law enforcement.5 5
The Court employed a de novo review rather than deferring to the trial
judge's determination for three reasons. 56 First, deference would create
inconsistent results because each trial judge may draw different inferences
from the same set of facts. 57 Second, de novo review allows "appellate
courts . . .to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles,"
because "the legal rules for ... reasonable suspicion acquire content only

through application. 58 Third, de novo review allows appellate courts to
create uniform rules, giving law enforcement clearer
rules to follow when
59
deciding whether to conduct an investigatory stop.
Although reasonable suspicion cases rarely have identical facts,
making it difficult for a case to act as a guide to law enforcement, prior
cases will have facts similar enough to current cases to provide a guide on
how the case will be resolved. 60 Also, officials6 can view cases collectively
to create a useful "body of law on the subject.", '
De novo review is subject to the appellate court giving due weight to
both local judges and law enforcement.62 Local judges examine the facts
and the inferences from those facts "in light of the distinctive features and
events of the community' 63 Similarly, law enforcement officers examine
64
the facts in light of their experience and expertise in law enforcement.
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from the Ornelas decision.65
According to Scalia, appellate courts should review reasonable suspicion
cases with deference to the trial court rather than de novo.6 6 Reasonable

" 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
56 Id.

57 Id.
58

id.

'9 Id.
at 697-98.
60 Id.at 698.
61 Id.

62 Id.at 699.
63 Id.
64 id.

65 Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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suspicion cases are fact-intensive, making a de novo review practically
useless.67
According to Scalia, precedent indicates that appellate courts should
review cases with deference when: (1)"the district court is 'better
positioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue," and (2) de novo
review "'will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine., 68 Reasonable
suspicion cases meet both requirements. 69 First, the district court is in the
best position to decide the case, because reasonable suspicion cases are factintensive.7v District courts have the advantage of hearing live testimony
and becoming more intimate with the facts, whereas appellate courts simply
rely on the record.7' Second, a de novo appellate review will not help
clarify the legal principal of reasonable suspicion.72 Clarifying reasonable
suspicion at the appellate level leads to generalizations, which is
inconsistent with the facts and circumstances test of a reasonable suspicion
analysis.73
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
75
Douglas, Arizona7 4 is a small town of approximately 14,000 residents
located in southeastern Arizona near the United States-Mexico border. 6
Highway 191 leads north from Douglas connecting with interstates leading
to Phoenix and Tucson.77 Just north of Douglas are the Chiricahua

67
68

Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S.

225, 233 (1991) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985))).
dissenting).
69 Id. (Scalia, J.,
70 Id. at 701-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
72 Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74 Douglas, founded 100 years ago, is primarily an agricultural and ranching community.
The City of Douglas at http://www.discoverdouglas.com/EconDev/Economy.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2002); the City of Douglas, at http://www.community.ci.Douglas.az.us/
images/poster4.jpg (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) (on file with the author).
75According to the 2000 Census, Douglas, Arizona, has a population of 14,312. Of the
14,312 people, 12,306 are Hispanic. United States Census Bureau, Census 2000, available
at http://factfinder.census.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
76 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 268 (2002).
77Id. Tucson is approximately 118 miles northwest of Douglas. The City of Douglas at
http://www.discoverdouglas.com/EconDev/Community%20Profile.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2002).
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Mountains, which contain a national monument, camping and hiking areas,
and a small lake.78
About thirty miles north of Douglas, at the intersection of Highway
191 and Rucker Canyon Road, 79 Border Patrol uses a checkpoint to capture
illegal alien and drug smugglers.80 In addition to the checkpoints, Border
Patrol conducts roving patrols to search the back roads for smugglers
attempting to avoid the checkpoint. 81 To assist the roving patrols, magnetic
sensors detect vehicles traveling north on Leslie 8Canyon
Road, an unpaved
2
road smugglers often use to avoid the checkpoint.
On January 19, 1998, Agent Clinton Stoddard ("Stoddard") was on
duty at the Douglas checkpoint. 83 In the afternoon, a magnetic sensor
located on Leslie Canyon Road detected a vehicle.84 Stoddard decided to
investigate the activation of the sensor for three reasons.85 First, smugglers
often use Leslie Canyon Road to avoid the checkpoint.8 6 Second, the sensor
was triggered during a shift change, so no roving patrols were in the area
and smuggling activity generally increased during shift changes.8 Third,
Stoddard knew that another agent stopped a minivan containing marijuana
in the area a few weeks earlier.88
Stoddard left the checkpoint heading east down Rucker Canyon Road
toward Leslie Canyon Road. 89 He received another report that the vehicle
triggered a second sensor on Rucker Canyon Road, suggesting that the
vehicle was traveling toward him. 90 As he traveled down the road,
Stoddard noticed a vehicle approaching in the distance. 9' He pulled off the
road to watch the vehicle pass, believing it to be the vehicle that activated
the sensors. 92 Stoddard noted that the approaching vehicle was a minivan,
7' The
City
of
Douglas
at
http://www.discoverdouglas.com/EconDev/
Community%20Profile.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
79 For a map of the checkpoint area, see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 278.
80

Id.

"' Id. at 269.
82

83

id.
Id. at 269.

84 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 269. The magnetic sensors on Leslie Canyon Road face south in
order to detect vehicles traveling north, presumably from Mexico. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 23-24, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (No. 00-1519).
85 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 269.
86 id.
87

id.

88

Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 270.

89

90 Id.
91 Id.
92

id
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because smugglers often use them. 93 The minivan was traveling at about
fifty miles per hour until it came close to Stoddard,
when it rapidly slowed
94
to about twenty-five to thirty miles per hour.
In the minivan, Stoddard could see a man driving, a woman in the
passenger seat, and three children in the back. 95 The man sat very stiff and
straight, keeping his eyes on the road.96 Normally, drivers usually either
look at Stoddard out of curiosity or wave. 97 In addition, the children's
98
knees were raised, suggesting their feet rested on something on the floor.
Based on these initial observations, Stoddard decided to follow the
minivan west down Rucker Canyon Road. 99 As he began to follow the
minivan, the children started moving their hands as if they were waving at
him. 00 This action was suspicious to Stoddard for three reasons.' 0' First,
the children waved facing forward even though Stoddard was behind the
minivan.10 2 Second, the children waved in an abnormal way, as if they
were instructed
to wave.' 0 3 Third, the children waved for about four or five
04
1
minutes.
At that point, the minivan approached an intersection, turning its right
turn signal on and then abruptly off.'0 5 Just before reaching the
intersection, 0the
driver turned his right turn signal back on and quickly
6
right.
turned
The minivan's decision to turn right concerned Stoddard. 0 7 If the
vehicle continued west down Rucker Canyon Road, it would have headed
to the checkpoint. 0 8 If the vehicle turned left, it would have headed toward
picnic and camping areas.' 0 9 Instead, the vehicle turned right onto a road
used mostly by four-wheel-drive vehicles, and more notably, the last road
93
94

id.
id.

95 Id.
96

id.

97

Id.

98 Id.
99 Id.
00

Id. at 270-71.

101 Id. at 271.

'02 Id. at 270-71.
103 Id. at 271.

14

id.

105 id.
106 id.
107id.
108

Id.

109

Id.
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available to avoid the checkpoint." 0 Still following the minivan, Stoddard
performed a registration check over the radio."' The check revealed that
"the minivan was registered ... in an area notorious for alien and narcotics
2
smuggling."' '
Based on his observations and the registration check, Stoddard stopped
the minivan to briefly investigate.' '3 The driver revealed that his name was
Ralph Arvizu.' 14 Stoddard asked Arvizu if he could search the minivan and
Arvizu consented." 5 During his search, Stoddard found over 128 pounds of
marijuana with a street value of almost $100,000.' 16
Stoddard arrested Arvizu who was charged with possession with intent
to distribute marijuana.' 7 During trial, Arvizu moved to suppress the
evidence, because "Stoddard did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop the
'" 8
Amendment."
Fourth
the
by
required
as
vehicle
B. THE TRIAL COURT UPHELD THE INVESTIGATORY STOP
The District Court held that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Arvizu was involved in criminal activity." 9 According to the
District Court, ten factors, taken together, led Stoddard to have reasonable
suspicion:
1) smugglers used the road in question to avoid the border patrol station; 2) Arvizu
drove by within an hour of a Border Patrol shift change; 3) a minivan stopped on the
same road a month earlier contained drugs; 4) minivans are among the types of
vehicles commonly used by smugglers; 5) the minivan slowed as it approached the
Border Patrol vehicle; 6) Arvizu appeared rigid and stiff, and did not acknowledge the
officer; 7) the officer did not recognize the minivan as a local car; 8) the children's
knees were raised, as if their feet were resting on something on the floor of the van; 9)
the children waved for several minutes but not towards the officer; and
1 2 0 10) the van
was registered to an address in a neighborhood notorious for smuggling.

Because Stoddard had reasonable suspicion, the District Court2 denied
Arvizu's motion to suppress and he was found guilty of possession.' '
110 Id.

111Id.
112

Id. at 271.

113id.
'14

Id.

1" Id. at 271-72.
116 Id. at 272.
117id.

118id.
119Id.

120United States v. Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000).
121 id.
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C. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT
The Ninth Circuit found that Stoddard did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop Arvizu based on the facts of the case. 2 2 Judge Reinhardt,
writing for the court, began by expressing the difficulty of applying facts
and circumstances tests due to the introduction of "a troubling degree of
uncertainty and unpredictability into the process.' 23 As a result, the court
wanted the decision to "clearly delimit ...

which certain factors may be

considered by law
enforcement officers in making stops such as the stop
124
involved here.'
According to the Ninth Circuit, the District Court improperly relied on
seven factors that have no place in a reasonable suspicion analysis.' 25 First,
the minivan slowing rapidly was an inappropriate factor, because precedent
prohibits relying on slowed speed.' 26 Slowing down when seeing law
enforcement was a perfectly natural response.' 27 Second, precedent
prohibits Arvizu's failure to acknowledge Stoddard as a factor. 28 Not
waving to an officer may demonstrate that a person is unfriendly, but not a
criminal. 2 9 Third, the children's waving was not relevant to the analysis. 3 °
If every bizarre act of a child was relevant, law enforcement could stop
almost any parent.' 3' Also, if Arvizu's failure to wave was a factor, then it
was inconsistent to allow the children's waving to be a factor. 32 Fourth,
the fact that an officer stopped a minivan containing marijuana on the same
road a month earlier was an inappropriate factor. 133 An officer hardly can
infer that all minivans on the road contain drugs based on one isolated

122

Arvizu, 232 F.3d at 1251. The Ninth Circuit's opinion, originally filed on July 7,

2000, was amended on December 1, 2000. Many of the changes add the phrase "in this
case," presumably to emphasize the importance of examining the facts and circumstances of
each case.
123 Id. at 1248.
124 Id.
125

Idat 1248-51.

126 Id. at 1248-49 (citing United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th

Cir. 2000); United States v. Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d 244, 247 (9th Cir. 1995)).
127 Id. at 1249.
128 Id. (citing United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1419 (9th Cir.
1989)).
129 Id. (citing Garcia-Camacho, 53 F.3d at 247; Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441,
1446 (9th Cir. 1994)).
130 id.
131

id.

132 id.
133 Id.
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incident.' 34 Fifth, Stoddard's inability to recognize Arvizu's minivan was
irrelevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis. 35 Both locals and tourists use
the road on which Arvizu was stopped, so "it is hardly surprising that a
Border Patrol agent would not recognize every passing car."' 3 6 Sixth, the
minivan's registration to an address in an area known for alien and drug
smuggling was an inappropriate factor.' 37 Not all individuals have control
over where they live due to financial difficulties. 38 Also, Stoddard did not
explain how he knew the reputation of the area.139 Last, the children's
raised knees were irrelevant to the analysis. 40 Although it suggests their
feet were propped on cargo, the cargo just 4as easily could have been picnic
and camping supplies as it was marijuana. ' '
After discussing the seven factors that did not belong in the reasonable
suspicion analysis, the Ninth Circuit focused on the remaining three factors
relied on by the District Court. 42 First, the fact that Arvizu was driving on
a road smugglers frequently use was not particularly significant, because
both locals and tourists use the road either as a shortcut or to visit the
national monument. 143 Second, the fact that Arvizu drove a minivan, a
vehicle smugglers use often, is also insignificant, because minivans are a
popular family vehicle in the United States. 44 Finally, the fact that Arvizu
was on the road during a shift change is not significant, because the time
was actually forty-five minutes before the shift change. 145 According to the
court, these three factors "are 46
not enough to constitute reasonable suspicion
either singly or collectively."'
The Ninth Circuit suppressed the marijuana evidence, because
Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory
stop. 147
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Stoddard
had reasonable suspicion as required under the Fourth Amendment to stop
134

id.

135

id.

136

Id. at 1250.

137

id.

138 id.

139 id.

142

Id. at 1250-5 1.
id.
Id. at 1251.

143

id.

144
145
146
147

id.
Id.
id.

40
141

Id. at 1251-52.
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"because of its importance to the enforcement of federal drug and

immigration laws."'

149

IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court,
holding that Stoddard had the requisite level of reasonable suspicion needed
under the Fourth Amendment
to stop Arvizu based on all facts and
50
circumstances of the case.'
Rehnquist first briefly discussed the current state of the law regarding
investigatory stops. 151
The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches, applies to investigatory stops where the driver has
not violated a traffic law. 152 Law enforcement may conduct investigatory
stops if the officer has "reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity 'may be afoot."" 53 The officer's reasonable suspicion must be
based on objective facts and inferences from those facts that a reasonable
law enforcement officer would draw and not based on hunches.' 54 When
taken together, the facts and inferences must lead the officer to believe that
criminal activity may be afoot. 5 5 This totality of the circumstances test
allows officers to use their experience to draw inferences from facts that
1 56
otherwise may mean little to the average citizen.
Rehnquist acknowledged that "the concept of reasonable suspicion is
somewhat abstract," but stressed the importance of not setting hard-fast
rules.'5 7 Hard-fast rules create "unnecessary difficulty in dealing with one
58
of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment."'
Next, Rehnquist criticized the Ninth Circuit for its sharp departure in
their analysis from the totality of the circumstances test. 59 The Ninth
148

United States v. Arvizu, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (granting writ of certiorari and motion

to proceed informa pauperis).
149United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
50Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78.
...Id. at 273.
152id.
153Id.
154
155

Id. at 273-74.
Id.at 273.

156id.
117Id. at 274.

Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989).

518

159Id.
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Circuit used a "divide-and-conquer" analysis, looking at each factor
1 60
individually to see whether each factor led to reasonable suspicion.
However, Terry v. Ohio161 and United States v. Sokolow 162 prohibit
analyzing each factor individually. 163 Although each factor individually
may appear innocent, the factors taken together may amount to reasonable
suspicion. 164
Rehnquist also criticized the Ninth Circuit for attempting "to 'clearly
delimit' an officer's consideration of certain factors to reduce 'troubling...
uncertainty."" 65 This attempt "underestimates the usefulness of the
reasonable-suspicion standard in guiding officers in the field."' 166 The entire
purpose of the de novo standard of review in reasonable suspicion cases is
to allow appellate courts to unify and clarify precedent.167 In doing so,
although the "factual 'mosaic"' in each case may differ, "'two decisions
together may usefully add to the body of law on the
when viewed
' ' 16 8
subject.
Rehnquist then gave two examples of how the Ninth Circuit's
"approach would ... seriously undercut the 'totality of the circumstances'
principles."' 169 The first example is Arvizu's slowed speed and failure to
acknowledge Stoddard.170 These actions may be meaningless on a busy
highway in San Francisco, but may be quite odd on a road in a scarcely
populated area of Southeastern Arizona.' 7 ' This example shows the
importance for law enforcement officers to evaluate all factors together "in
training and familiarity with the customs of the
light of . . . specialized
' 72
area's inhabitants."'
Second, the children's waving was an example of the Ninth Circuit's
misapplication of the totality of the circumstances analysis. 73 The waving
was not mere child's play, but "'methodical,' 'mechanical,' and

160

Id.

161392 U.S. 1 (1968).
163

490 U.S. 1 (1989).
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 266-67, 274-75.

164

id.

165

169

Id. at 275 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 232 F. 3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. (quoting Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98 (1989)).
id.

170

Id. at 275-76.

171

id.

172
173

Id. at 276.
Id.

162

166
167
168
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'abnormal,"' as Stoddard demonstrated to the District Court. 174 The Ninth
Circuit, unable to see Stoddard demonstrate what he saw, should have given
due weight to Stoddard and the District Court, both of whom saw the
waving and made the reasonable assumption that the children were doing
75
something other than playing.
Rehnquist then concluded "[i]t was reasonable for Stoddard to infer
from his observations, his registration check, and his experience as a border
patrol agent that respondent had set out from Douglas along a little-traveled
route used by smugglers to avoid the 191 checkpoint."'' 76 Rehnquist
emphasized that "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists ... need
not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.' 77 In this case each factor,
when viewed separately, has an innocent explanation, but when viewed
collectively, is enough to lead to reasonable suspicion. 178 Stoddard's
investigatory stop of Arvizu, therefore, was not a violation of the Fourth
79
Amendment. 1
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding 80 and remanded the
case for further proceedings.' 8 '
Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a).
Id.
176 Id. at 277.
177 Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
178 Id. at 277-78.
174

175

179

id.

Apparently, the Ninth Circuit chose to ignore the Supreme Court's decision in
deciding other reasonable suspicion cases. After the Ninth Circuit decided Arvizu, but
before the Supreme Court heard the case, the Ninth Circuit ruled on a boarder patrol case
similar to Arvizu. In United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2001), the
court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. The court
examined each individual factor's relevance and appropriateness, and determined that each
factor had an innocent explanation. Id. After the Supreme Court ruled on Arvizu, the Ninth
Circuit amended its decision in Sigmund-Ballesteros. United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros,
285 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2002). The amended decision changed the earlier decision very
little, only adding that it must look at the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1121. Later,
the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc, but not without a vigorous dissent.
United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 309 F.3d 545, 545-50 (9th Cir. 2002). Judge
Kleinfeld, writing on behalf of himself and five other judges, criticized the two judges who
refused rehearing: "Here we go again. The decision that we have decided not to rehear en
banc defies a Supreme Court decision that reversed a previous decision of ours, making the
identical error, arguably creates a mistaken rule on 'profiling,' and reduces America's ability
to patrol its borders." Id. at 545-46.
"' Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 278. The issues on remand were whether: (1) Arvizu voluntarily
consented to Stoddard's search, and (2) the search exceeded the scope of consent by not only
searching the van but also the duffel bags inside the van. United States v. Arvizu, 2002 WL
464507 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit held that Arvizu's consent was voluntary,
because Stoddard did not coerce Arvizu or have Arvizu in his custody when he asked for
1s0
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B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court because it followed
Ornelas v. United States,'82 which dictates a de novo review with due
weight to the inferences of law enforcement and local judges.' 83 However,
he reiterated his view expressed in his Ornelas dissent that giving due
weight to the trial court's inferences (instead of factual findings) is
incompatible with a de novo review. 8 4 A de novo review permits the Court
of Appeals to review the trial court's inferences and conclusions (but not
factual findings), but this type of review is prohibited in the reasonable
suspicion with due weight review. 115
Scalia concluded by noting, "even holding the Ninth Circuit to no
of de novo review, its judgment here
more than the traditional methodology
' 86
would have to be reversed."'
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court properly held that Stoddard's investigatory stop of
Arvizu did not violate the Fourth Amendment. First, the Court's decision is
consistent with precedent. Second, the facts and circumstances analysis
used by the Court is superior to setting hard-fast rules. Third, the analysis
properly views the facts and inferences from local law enforcement's point
of view. Finally, racial profiling and the ability of law enforcement to stop
vehicles for any reason will not occur based on the Arvizu decision.
A. THE SUPREME COURT PROPERLY UPHELD THE INVESTIGATORY
STOP BECAUSE PRECEDENT REQUIRES A TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
The Supreme Court properly held that the investigatory stop was
within the Fourth Amendment because the Court followed precedent in its

decision. Under United States v. Sokolow, 187 United States v. Cortez, 188 and

consent. Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that Stoddard's search did not exceed the scope of
Arvizu's consent, because the consent included the duffel bags. id. Even if the consent did
not include the duffel bags, Stoddard had probable cause to search the bags, because of the
smell of marijuana coming from the bags. Id.
82 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
...Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 278 (Scalia, J., concurring).
184Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
185 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
186Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117490

U.S. 1(1989).

I' 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
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United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,8 9 the Court must examine all facts and
reasonable inferences collectively to determine whether the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe the individual was engaged in criminal
activity. 90 In Arvizu, the Supreme Court examined all the facts and the
inferences Stoddard made collectively to determine that those facts and
inferences amounted to a reasonable suspicion that Arvizu was engaged in
criminal activity.
A proper reasonable suspicion analysis identifies specific facts,
including objective observations and information received from police
reports, and views them from the perspective of the law enforcement
9
officer, allowing him or her to draw any inferences that are reasonable.1 1
These facts and inferences are next examined collectively to determine if
they lead to reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal
activity.' 9'
In Arvizu, the Supreme Court properly identified the facts and
observations Stoddard used in deciding to stop Arvizu, and viewed them in
light of Stoddard's experience as a border patrol agent:

189 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
190 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-9; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
884-85.
'9' Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 884.
192 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.

1050

SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE W

[Vol. 93

Table 1' 93
Viewed In Light of Officer Stoddard's
Experience

Fact
A vehicle triggered a magnetic
sensor on a back road near a
Border Patrol checkpoint.

*

*
*

The vehicle triggered the
sensor during a Border Patrol
shift change.
The vehicle was a minivan.

*

*

*
The minivan slowed
significantly as it approached
the Border Patrol vehicle.
The driver of the minivan sat
erect and did not acknowledge
the border patrol agent.
The children in the backseat of
the minivan had their knees
raised.
The children waved for four to
five minutes.
The minivan turned north onto
Kuykendall Cutoff Road.

*

Most drivers either wave or look at border
patrol agents out of curiosity.

*

The children had their feet propped on
something.

*

The waving appeared odd and mechanical.
The children waved forward, even though
the officer was behind the vehicle.
Kuykendall is the last road available to
avoid the checkpoint.
Kuykendall is an unpaved road, usually
only used by four-wheel drive vehicles.
The address was located in an area known
for smuggling.

*

*

*
A registration check revealed
the minivan was registered to
an address close to the border.

Drug and illegal alien smugglers often use
the road to circumvent the checkpoint.
Local ranchers and forest service
personnel mostly use the road.
A vehicle containing marijuana triggered
the same sensor about a month earlier.
Smugglers time their activity to coincide
with shift changes, because no officers are
patrolling the area.
Minivans are a popular vehicle for
smugglers.
A minivan containing drugs was stopped a
month earlier.

*

After compiling the facts and circumstances, the Court then examined
them collectively, instead of looking at the appropriateness of each factor

193 The facts in this table are set forth in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 269-71,
276 (2002) and Brief for the Petitioner at 6, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)
(No. 00-1519).
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like the Ninth Circuit. 194 A totality of the circumstances test views all
factors as a whole rather than reviewing them individually to determine
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion. 95 Looking at the facts and
circumstances as a whole, the Court determined that Stoddard had the
requisite reasonable suspicion to stop Arvizu. 196 The Court properly
disregarded the fact that there were alternative possibilities to Arvizu's
conduct (such as picnicking or camping), because a reasonable suspicion
analysis does
not require certainty that the individual is engaged in criminal
97
activity. 1
In the end, the Supreme Court followed precedent. The Court
examined the circumstances collectively as viewed from a trained law
enforcement officer to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed.
B. HARD-SET RULES SEVERELY RESTRICT INVESTIGATORY STOPS
AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
If the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach in
Arvizu, 198-analyzing each factor individually to determine whether it is
appropriate in a reasonable suspicion analysis-it would be impossible to
conduct an investigatory stop within the Fourth Amendment. First, certain
factors have more significance in particular geographic areas or,
alternatively, no significance at all, creating difficulty in developing
uniform factors applicable throughout the country or to all criminal activity.
Second, only permitting certain factors provides an easy way for criminals
to beat the system by providing them with a list of what to do to avoid an
investigatory stop. A totality of the circumstances test, on the other hand,
provides flexibility to meet the needs of a particular geographic area or
criminal activity.
Requiring law enforcement officers to consider only certain factors
would hinder their ability to conduct an investigatory stop due to the
inability to construct a list of factors relevant to all geographic areas or
criminal activity. For example, the fact that the officer does not recognize
the individual or vehicle may be relevant in a small town with no tourists
but is meaningless in a large city like Chicago. 199 In addition, allowing the
'9'

Id. at 277.

195 United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989).

Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
197 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (using as an example Terry v. Ohio,
196

392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

198 United States v. Arvizu, 217 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2000).
199 Another geographically relevant factor is rental vehicles from Florida, Texas,

Maryland, New York and New Jersey, but this factor is only relevant in locations a good
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type of vehicle as a permissible factor may be relevant in smuggling cases
where certain vehicles are used frequently but not relevant in prostitution
cases where there is no consistent vehicle type. Because of the difficulty in
setting a complete list of factors applicable to all geographic areas and
criminal activities, law enforcement would have difficulty finding enough
factors to constitute reasonable suspicion to justify stopping any individual.
Even if the Court could construct a list of factors relevant to all
geographic areas, this list would allow criminals to avoid an investigatory
stop. Many criminals are smarter than society would like to believe. For
instance, criminals scout Border Patrol shift changes for times of
unpatrolled areas 200 and remove door panels to hide drugs inside them. 20 1 If
the courts set a restrictive list of permissible factors, criminals could adapt
their behavior to avoid enough factors to prevent reasonable suspicion.
In the end, hard-set rules are improper for a reasonable suspicion
analysis. Not only are defined rules difficult to construct as applicable to
all geographic areas and criminal activity, but they also provide a guide for
criminals attempting to avoid detection.
C. THE FACTS SHOULD BE VIEWED FROM THE PERSEPCTIVE OF
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
A reasonable suspicion analysis should view the facts and inferences
from the point of view of the officer conducting the stop. Local law
enforcement officers are on the streets observing, investigating and
arresting individuals. Officers know the habits of criminals and signs of
crime that a judge or juror might not know.20 2 For example, in Ornelas v.
United States, an officer who had searched almost 2000 cars for drugs was
aware that drug smugglers often use Oldsmobiles because of the ease of
hiding the drugs in interior panels.20 3 When he noticed a loose, rusty screw
on an interior panel of an Oldsmobile, the officer drew on this knowledge to
infer the panel had been removed to smuggle drugs.20 4 To the average
citizen, however, the loose, rusty screw would have suggested an older car
that was falling apart.2 °5 Consequently, courts should view the facts and

distance from these states and with little tourism. See Drug Courier Profile Indicators, at
http://www.cass.net/-w-dogs/lcour.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
200 See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 269.
201 See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1989).
202 See id. at 700.
203 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996).
204

id.

205

Id. at 700.
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circumstances in light of law enforcement's experience, because it provides
them insight on criminal behavior.
Professor Anthony Thompson suggests that law enforcement officers
inevitably rely on stereotypes rather than experience when assessing the
facts and circumstances. 206 In order to process information quickly and
simply, the human brain uses categories such as race, ethnicity, and gender
to store information. °7 When an officer evaluates situations to determine if
they are consistent with criminal activity, an officer relies on categorization
to find traits that they believe are associated with criminal activity.2 °8
Consequently, "stereotyping would appear integral to the police officer's
world. 2 °9
In order to prevent law enforcement from abusing the power of
discretion or relying on inappropriate stereotypes, 22110 the courts provide a
check on the reasonableness of the factors and inferences used by the
officer. 2t
When an officer conducts an investigatory stop that is
challenged, the officer must identify the factors and inferences relied upon
as well as the basis for the reliance. 21 2 The court will uphold the stop under
the Fourth Amendment only if the officer can articulate such factors. 21 3 If
the officer instead relies on stereotypes and hunches, the stop will violate
the Fourth Amendment.21 4
In the end, the facts and inferences should be viewed from the
perspective of the officer conducting the stop because their training and
experience in law enforcement provides them with knowledge beyond that
of the average citizen. The courts review this power for abuse by requiring
the officer to articulate specific facts and circumstances.

206 Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983-92 (1999).

207
201
209
210

Id.at 983-86.
Id. at 986-87.
Id. at 987.
For a detailed discussion on the possible abuse of police power, see Frank Rudy

Cooper, The Un-balancedFourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial
Profilingand Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 884-89 (2002) ("[L]aw enforcement's call for a
drug war has influenced the United States Supreme Court to accept racial profiling and limit
appellate review of police activity."); Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs,
Migrants, and the Rule of Law, 47 VILL. L. REV. 897, 915-19 (2002) ("[P]olice may rely
excessively on race in criminal investigation and emphasize it over all else.").
211 See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697.
212United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981).
213 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
214 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
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D. THE SUGGESTED EFFECTS OF THE REASONABLE SUSPICION
ANALYSIS IN AR VIZU WILL NOT OCCUR

Scholars criticize the reasonable suspicion analysis for encouraging
racial profiling and permitting an officer to stop a vehicle for any reason.
Neither criticism is valid.
Many critics of the reasonable suspicion test contend that the test
permits racial profiling, because it uses stereotypes and profiles." 5 These
stereotypes draw conclusions of criminal activity based on the race of the
individual under the assumption that certain races are more likely to commit
crimes than other races.21 6
Contrary to this criticism, racial profiling is not encouraged, and
certainly not allowed in a reasonable suspicion analysis. 21 7 At one time, the
Supreme Court permitted race as a factor in immigration cases, 218 but recent
cases suggest it is no longer a permissible factor. 21 9 Even when the Court
may have permitted race as a factor, the officer still needed enough other
objective factors and reasonable inferences to amount to reasonable
suspicion, making race almost superfluous to the analysis. 2 0 Furthermore,
Arvizu does not support racial profiling for three reasons. First, the District
Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court did not rely on race or
ethnicity as a factor.2
Second, the record suggests that Stoddard did not
know Arvizu's ethnicity. 222 Finally, assuming arguendo Stoddard did know
Arvizu's ethnicity, it was not223until he had stopped Arvizu that he could
have discovered his ethnicity.
215 Cooper, supra note 210, at 869-76; Johnson, supra note 210, at 900-06; David A.
Harris, The Stories, Statistics, and the Law. Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 265, 310-19 (1997). For a general discussion on racial profiling, see Samuel R.
Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002);
David Rudovsky, Breaking the Pattern of Racial Profiling, 38 JTLA TRIAL 29 (Aug. 2002).
For a detailed list of articles and books on the use of race in deciding to arrest or stop an
individual, see Thompson, supra note 206, at 1013 n. 1.
216 Cooper, supra note 210, at 870-72.
217 See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134 (2000), cert denied 531
U.S. 889 (2000); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886 (1975).
218 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.
219 Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1134.
220 E.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (race alone not enough to conduct an
investigatory stop of a vehicle).
221 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241
(9th Cir. 2000).
222 See Brief for the Petitioner at 41a-42a, 68a, Arvizu (No. 00-1519). Arvizu indicated
he was born and raised in Arizona, spoke unbroken English, and did not appear an illegal
alien. Id.
223 See Brief for the Petitioner at 108a, Arvizu (No. 00-1519). Stoddard asked if Miranda

2003]

UNITED STATES v. AR VIZU

1055

Adding to the criticism, Professor David Moran contends that the
reasonable suspicion test permits an officer to stop a vehicle for any
reason.224 Professor Moran finds it appalling that the Court would permit
the investigatory stop in Arvizu:
[I]t would be hard to imagine less suspicious behavior than a man driving a minivan
containing several children near a national monument in the middle of the afternoon,
slowing down for a police car without looking at the officer, and then continuing on
his way scrupulously obeying all traffic laws while the children wave more or less in
the direction of the officer.
According to Professor Moran, the Supreme Court's ruling that the facts in
Arvizu are enough to create reasonable suspicion permits officers to take
completely innocent facts and invent reasons for finding reasonable
suspicion.226
If the facts of Arvizu had been as so simply described, the Supreme
Court decision would have been incorrect. However, Professor Moran
colors some of the facts while omitting other facts, reinforcing the
importance of utilizing the totality of the circumstances test. For instance,
Professor Moran suggests that the children were waving "more or less in
the direction of the officer,, 227 whereas the children really were waving in
the exact opposite direction of the officer, toward no one.228 Also, although
Arvizu was driving near a national monument, Professor Moran failed to
acknowledge that Arvizu was not driving to see the monument, because he
was not driving to or away from the monument.129 Examining all of the
facts and circumstances rather than just a chosen few demonstrates that
Stoddard had enough evidence to believe that Arvizu was engaged in
criminal activity, without the need to invent inferences to find reasonable
suspicion.

rights read in English or Spanish. Id. Although Stoddard asked if Arvizu wanted his
Miranda rights read in English or Spanish, this action is not indicative that Stoddard knew

Arvizu was Hispanic. Officers often give Miranda rights in various languages to be sure
they do not violate an individual's Fifth Amendment rights. See David R. Jankowsky & Eric
R. Sherman, CustodialInterrogations,90 GEO. L.J. 1240, 1241 n.500 & 502, 1251 n.537,

1252 n.543, 1264 (2002).
David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search
Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 833-37 (2002).
224

225

Id. at 835.

226

Id. at 836-37.

227

Id. at 835.
Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Arvizu, (No. 00-1519). The Supreme Court stated in its

228

opinion that the children's waving may be considered, but it has little weight in the analysis.

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).
229 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 271-72.
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Disregarding Professor Moran's misstatements, the reasonable
suspicion analysis prevents officers from inventing inferences from
completely innocent facts, because it requires officers to provide some basis
for their inference.23 ° In addition, the inference must be a logical and
reasonable deduction from the facts. 2 3' Therefore, officers would have
difficulty inventing factors, because the analysis requires them to explain
the basis for the factors in order to show their decision to stop the individual
was reasonable.
In the end, criticism of the reasonable suspicion analysis and Arvizu
decision are unfounded, because race is not permitted as a factor in a
reasonable suspicion analysis and Arvizu does not allow an officer to take
innocent facts and construe them to invent reasonable suspicion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Arvizu does not
declare any new law, but merely provides another example of what amounts
to reasonable suspicion.232 The Court followed precedent, invoking the
totality of the circumstances test to uphold the investigatory stop. This test
is the appropriate method for evaluating an investigatory stop for
reasonable suspicion, because it is adaptable to all geographic areas and
criminal activity. Also, it properly views the facts from the perspective of
the stopping officers, allowing them to draw from their experience and
training in deciding to stop the vehicle. Furthermore, case law suggests that
the test does not encourage racial profiling or permit an officer to stop a
vehicle for any reason, preventing those challenges to the totality of the
circumstances test.
Jennifer Pelic

230 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981).
231 See id.
232

Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Stahlman, New Developments in Search and Seizure:

More than Just a Matter of Semantics, 2002 ARMY LAW. 31, 39 (May 2002)
[T]he significance of United States v. Arvizu lies more with its facts than on any new twists or
changes in the law. [T]he facts vary dramatically among these 'vehicle stop' cases. Arvizu
provides a good set of facts along with the Supreme Court's analysis on how those facts
adequately raised a reasonable suspicion.

